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5. Sharing global regulatory space: 




The governance of the global market for over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives 
has undergone a metamorphosis. Set in motion by the Group of Twenty (G20) 
2009 summit in Pittsburgh, the regulatory overhaul has transformed what 
used to be a relatively harmonious and transnational legal regime into a global 
regulatory space which – like all regulatory spaces (Hancher and Moran 1998) 
– is highly contested. In the light of the hypotheses developed in Chapter 1 of 
this book, this chapter evaluates the implementation and coordination of the 
globally agreed derivatives reforms in and between the United States and the 
European Union (for earlier research on this topic, see Godwin et al. 2017). 
The chapter focuses specifically on the possible implications of coordination 
challenges for regulatory structures. The hypothesis is that, together with the 
risk of regulatory arbitrage, regulatory competition contributes to regulatory 
centralisation in internal regulatory structures.
Prompted by the Global Financial Crisis, the G20 initiatives aimed to 
increase the transparency and stability of derivative markets, particularly by 
centralising the execution of trading within regulated trading venues and by 
imposing mandatory clearing, reporting and risk-management requirements. 
However, instalment of the new governance system has been cumbersome. 
Much of the consensus reached under the G20 umbrella was lost when soft 
principles and policy goals were translated into hard rules. As section 5.2 will 
show, failures in coordination have resulted in an uneven regulatory playing 
field characterised by jurisdictional conflicts, inconsistencies, regulatory over-
laps and gaps (Carney 2013, p. 15). The Financial Stability Board (FSB), man-
dated by the G20 to oversee and coordinate the implementation of the reforms, 
has also admitted that due to the unprecedented scale and complexity of the 
reforms and unforeseen challenges the implementation “has taken longer than 
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originally intended” (FSB 2017, p. 3). Ten years after the Pittsburgh summit, 
the reforms are still to be completed (FSB 2018).
The delay is partly explained by the fact that the United States and the 
European Union ended up locking themselves in a “transatlantic regulatory 
turf war” (Stafford 2014). This chapter analyses this transatlantic conflict 
as a coordination challenge typical of shared regulatory spaces. Situations 
in which several agencies with overlapping and conflicting mandates are 
forced to share authority and responsibility are common in national contexts 
(Freeman and Rossi 2011). This is not often the case in the global context, 
where regulatory sovereignty continues to be seen as a “territorial prerogative” 
(Buxbaum 2002, p. 933; see also Brummer 2010). However, the regulatory 
space for global derivative markets resists neat jurisdictional partitioning. 
Indeed, the cross-Atlantic dialogues on OTC derivatives regulation have 
rightly been labelled ‘joint jurisdiction’ issues (CFTC 2013a).
Two important factors have contributed to the ‘shared’ nature of the global 
regulatory space for OTC derivatives. First, unlike rules such as those on 
capital adequacy, which are entity-specific, many of the new rules target 
derivative contracts themselves (e.g. mandatory clearing and collateralisation 
of contracts). Such rules apply to both sides of the contract. The problem is that 
when the contracting parties are from different jurisdictions it is not always 
clear which rules apply. For instance, around 80 per cent of credit derivative 
transactions had a cross-border element in 2012 (Barnier 2013). At the time 
Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy, it had hundreds of thousands of deriv-
ative contracts outstanding with around 8,000 different counterparties around 
the globe (Hull 2011, p. 3).
Second, the shared regulatory space has emerged as a by-product of juris-
dictional contestation. Section 5.2 explains how the use of certain unilateral 
regulatory strategies by the EU and the US – consisting of extraterritoriality, 
conditional deference and (direct and indirect) protectionism – have contrib-
uted to the creation of the global regulatory space. These strategies are key to 
understanding the emergence and dynamics of this regulatory space and its 
implications for regulatory structures. Much of the unilateralism has been jus-
tified by the need to contain the risks of regulatory competition and regulatory 
arbitrage, that is, the relocation of regulated activities to jurisdictions with less 
costly or more accommodating rules.
Section 5.3 analyses how the shared and highly contested nature of this 
novel regulatory space affects regulatory structures. It argues that the reforms 
have indeed increased pressure to centralise (vertically) and to consolidate 
(horizontally) regulatory authority, especially within the EU. Section 5.4 
briefly discusses the limits of unilateral regulatory strategies from a more 
normative perspective, also considering certain future options and trajectories. 
Section 5.5 concludes.
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5.2 OTC DERIVATIVES AND THE REGULATORY 
REFORM
5.2.1 The Context of the Reform
Derivatives are financial instruments the value of which depends on the perfor-
mance and price of a reference asset, rate or index, or some other underlying 
variable. Derivatives can hedge against negative price movements or unfa-
vourable events (such as a rise in fuel prices, or debtor’s default) but they may 
also be used for speculation or arbitrage (see generally Hull 2011, pp. 10‒16). 
Options and forwards provide the ancestral building blocks of all derivatives. 
A forward agreement simply sets a future time and price for buying or selling 
an asset, whereas an option holder has the right, but not the obligation, to 
buy (call option) or sell (put option) the underlying asset at a certain future 
time. The most common forward-based derivatives are swaps, which involve 
an exchange of sequential cash flows, such as fixed interest cash flows for 
floating interest cash flows (interest rate swaps). Credit default swaps (CDS) 
are a specific type of swap offering protection against default on a loan (Hu 
1993; Hull 2011, pp. 5‒8). At the most complex end, financial products may 
be securitised or structured so that derivatives themselves act as the underlying 
asset (Yen and Lai 2014, pp. 2‒3).
OTC derivatives, especially CDSs, were at the centre of the 2007‒2009 
financial crisis (see, e.g. FCIC 2011, pp. 50‒51). In its immediate aftermath, 
the G20 took decisive action and in 2009 issued the following statement:
All standardized OTC derivative contracts should be traded on exchanges or elec-
tronic trading platforms, where appropriate, and cleared through central counterpar-
ties by end-2012 at the latest. OTC derivative contracts should be reported to trade 
repositories. Non-centrally cleared contracts should be subject to higher capital 
requirements. (G20 2009)
The reform therefore concerned: (a) the organisation of the entire market 
(on-exchange vs. OTC); (b) the clearing and settlement of trades (central 
clearing vs. bilateral settlement); (c) the transparency of the OTC market 
(trade reporting); and (d) the management of payment and delivery risks 
for uncleared derivatives. Importantly, the G20 later updated the policy by 
agreeing that uncleared OTC derivatives should also be subject to mandatory 
collateralisation rules.
These far-reaching reforms were in particular aimed at the obscure OTC 
segment of the derivative markets, which had for long avoided public regulation 
(Partnoy 2001; Carruthers 2013). All derivatives are traded over-the-counter 
or through regulated exchanges. Derivative exchanges, such as the Chicago 
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Board of Exchange, offer a limited number of highly standardised products, 
whereas the private OTC market allows for infinite customisation. In the 
mid-1980s, the public and exchange-traded derivative market was larger than 
the private OTC market, but by 2008 the latter had not only surpassed the 
public market but in fact was worth roughly ten times as much (Carruthers 
2013). In June 2013, only 9 per cent of all derivatives were traded on 
exchanges (Deutsche Börse and Eurex Clearing 2014, p. 7). The G20 reforms 
aimed to relocate much of the private OTC market in public, transparent and 
regulated exchanges.
Second, whereas the private OTC market (particularly the CDS market) 
came close to collapsing in 2008‒2009, the derivative clearing houses (central 
counterparties, or CCPs) navigated through the turmoil relatively unharmed. 
Instead of public support, the CCPs relied on their sophisticated default man-
agement systems. Centralised clearing mitigates payment and delivery risks 
by centralising it: the role of a CCP is to become a buyer to every seller and 
a seller to every buyer. CCPs have traditionally cleared all exchange-traded 
derivatives but only some standardised OTC derivatives. The G20 reforms 
aimed to expand the scope of derivative-clearing through CCPs by making 
it mandatory where possible, and also by making it more expensive to enter 
purely bilateral contracts.
Third, the financial crisis revealed that the private OTC market was prone 
to systematic under-collateralisation. The fact that ‘margining’ was left to the 
parties’ commercial judgment meant that market participants with solid credit 
ratings could effectively trade without committing capital (Singh 2010). In 
contrast, cleared and exchange-traded derivatives are subject to mandatory 
margin requirements2 and CCP participants must also contribute to the CCP’s 
default funds. To diminish the discrepancies between the public and private 
markets, the G20 reforms expand the scope of mandatory margining also to 
those OTC contracts that remain uncleared.
Although still unfinished, the reforms have significantly affected market 
structure. The majority of interest rate derivatives and a significant portion of 
CDS contracts are now centrally cleared (FSB 2017, pp. 12‒13). Mandatory 
collateralisation of OTC contracts is meant to further push trading towards 
public exchanges and clearing houses. However, the regulatory push towards 
centralised clearing has not terminated the competition between public and 
private derivative markets and the flexibility and lighter cost structure of the 
OTC market may still trump the safety of exchange-based trading (ISDA 2013, 
p. 4; Kentz 2014). For instance, in 2015 the Chicago Board Options Exchange 
submitted a letter to the SEC highlighting the fact that despite regulatory 
efforts, some markets were moving away from exchanges (McCormick 2015).
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5.2.2 From Consensus to Conflict
The transforming market for derivatives represents a stark contrast to the 
pre-crisis OTC markets, which were primarily based on a transnational 
self-regulation regime (Braithwaite 2012). As Chapter 6 in this book shows, 
the terms and standards offered by the International Swaps and Derivatives 
Association (ISDA) as part of its Master Agreement structure have provided 
the dominant contractual framework for OTC transactions since the 1980s (see 
also Feder 2002, p. 741; Choi and Gulati 2006, p. 1140).
The implementation of the G20 initiatives has nevertheless faced several 
complications. To become effective, the G20 policy commitments needed 
to be translated into hard rules locally and regionally. For instance, the EU 
enacted the commitments with two key regulations: Regulation 648/2012 of 
the European Parliament and Council on OTC derivatives, central counter-
parties and trade repositories (EMIR) and Regulation 600/2014 on Markets 
in Financial Instruments (MiFIR). EMIR implements the mandatory clearing 
obligation (EMIR, Articles 4 and 5) while MiFIR requires that all sufficiently 
liquid and cleared OTC derivatives must be traded on regulated trading venues 
(MiFIR, Article 32).
In the United States, the reforms were implemented as part of the Dodd–
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. The regulatory out-
comes in the EU and the US significantly differed in detail and the divergences 
only grew larger as the reforms moved from the legislative to the executive 
stage. As a result, for example, one jurisdiction may require mandatory clear-
ing of a certain OTC derivative contract and/or the execution of the trade on 
a regulated market while the other jurisdiction leaves the choice to the markets. 
The personal scope of regulations also differ. For instance, the EMIR exempts 
certain pension scheme arrangements (transitionally) and intra-group trades 
from the scope of the regulation, which is not the case in the US. The original 
EMIR rules also captured both financial and certain non-financial counter-
parties in much the same way, whereas in the US the scope for non-financial 
counterparties is more tailored. Inconsistencies have also arisen in the context 
of trade reporting requirements (ESMA 2013, pp. 22‒23).
Conflicts concerning transaction-level rules are particularly hard to recon-
cile. Consider, for instance, the concentration rules, which direct certain stand-
ardised contracts into centralised clearing and on organised trading venues. 
These rules apply to both sides of the contract, regardless of the fact that 
the parties might be located in different jurisdictions. In such a situation one 
jurisdiction’s rules cannot be followed without breaching another’s (Carney 
2013, p. 15). Collateralisation rules may also lead to such direct conflicts. In so 
far as they concern the amount of collateral that should be posted, market par-
ticipants can simply meet the highest requirement, but the rules also concern 
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the division between the initial and variable margins, the classes of collateral 
eligible and the way collateral must be segregated (Greene and Potiha 2012, 
p. 281).
Anticipating such conflicts, the G20 tasked the Financial Stability Board 
(FSB) with overseeing coordination of the reforms among national legislators 
and regulators. International standard-setting bodies such as the International 
Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) and the Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision (BCBS) have also developed numerous principles 
and standards to guide implementation. A specific OTC Derivatives Working 
Group representing a mass of technocratic expertise from national jurisdictions 
and international organisations was also set up to coordinate implementation 
(this body was nevertheless short-lived; see Knaack 2015).
The FSB repeatedly urged regulators to identify examples of any regulatory 
overlaps, inconsistencies and conflicts and to develop options for addressing 
the issues (FSB 2012). Most importantly, in 2013 the G20 declared that “juris-
dictions and regulators should be able to defer to each other when it is justified 
by the quality of their respective regulatory and enforcement regimes” (G20 
2013, p. 18, emphasis added). Generally speaking, deference refers to a type 
of cross-border regulation in which national authorities rely on each other 
when carrying out the regulation or supervision of participants that operate 
cross-border. In practice, it may encompass various regulatory mechanisms, 
such as tailored exemptions, substituted compliance and various recognition 
and equivalence frameworks (IOSCO 2019, p. 3).
Progress towards a deference-based recognition regime has been slow and 
uncertain. An FSB progress report (2015, pp. 13‒14) summarised the prevail-
ing concerns:
Several authorities […] note that unevenness in the pace of implementation of 
reforms, as well as inconsistencies or gaps in the application of requirements to 
cross-border transactions, can result in duplicative or overlapping requirements 
or lead to opportunities for regulatory arbitrage. Some authorities note that this, in 
turn, could result in market fragmentation and decreased liquidity. In addition, some 
emerging market and developing economies have indicated that challenges may be 
presented by the potential cross-border impact of reforms, such as meeting recogni-
tion/equivalence requirements of major financial centres in OTC derivatives.
Indeed, the lack of a level playing field and legal uncertainty has had unin-
tended effects on OTC derivative markets. Reports have noted a significant 
drop in international trading activity and a fragmentation of liquidity along 
geographical lines (Artamonov 2015; ISDA 2015; FSB 2017, pp. 5‒6; IIF 
2019). This ongoing market fragmentation illustrates the sensitivity of OTC 
derivatives to legal uncertainty. Without a level playing field, a predictable 
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system of deference (where market participants can comply with just one 
jurisdiction’s rules) would be needed to stop market fragmentation.
However, such a system might also invite other kinds of strategic behaviour. 
Derivatives are also known for their ability to reduce the costs of, or capture 
profit opportunities created by, differing laws, tax rules or accounting require-
ments (Partnoy 1997, pp. 227‒228). Such regulatory arbitrage has been rela-
tively easy. The parties to derivative contracts may simply book transactions 
in their preferred jurisdiction (see Goodhart and Lastra 2010, p. 715; Riles 
2014, p. 88). The dual risks of regulatory arbitrage and market fragmentation 
have challenged regulators and policymakers, especially in the EU and the US. 
The following section illustrates how a mix of unilateral regulatory strategies 
helped create, and later manage, a full-blown regulatory conflict between the 
Atlantic neighbours.
5.2.3 Managing Regulatory Arbitrage: Between Extraterritoriality 
and Deference
To counter regulatory arbitrage risks, lawmakers in the US and EU have 
claimed extraterritorial authority for their rules. For instance, certain provi-
sions in EMIR (e.g. the clearing obligation) even apply to contracts between 
non-EU entities when those contracts would have a direct, substantial and 
foreseeable effect in the EU. The effect of these EMIR rules can also be 
extended abroad whenever it is considered necessary or appropriate to prevent 
the evasion of any EMIR provisions (see, e.g., Arts. 4(5) and 11(12)).
Similar rules were included in the Dodd–Frank Act. The act provides that its 
provisions on derivatives (the act uses the term ‘swap’) apply to any activities 
outside the United States that either (i) have a direct and significant connection 
with activities in, or effect on, United States commerce or that (ii) contravene 
rules or regulations that are necessary or appropriate to prevent the evasion of 
any of the act’s provisions (sections 722(d) and 772(b)).
The similarity between these rules is not a coincidence. The US has a long 
history of exporting its capital market rules to foreign countries and the extra-
territorial reach of its derivative rulebook was just a continuation of this policy 
motivated by a fear of regulatory arbitrage (and also the risk of losing market 
share). As Coffee argues, the extraterritorial application of financial regulation 
cannot be avoided in a world where mobile financial institutions “can easily 
park their higher-risk operations abroad and beyond the regulatory reach of 
their home country” (see Coffee 2014, p. 1260). The aggressive US stance nev-
ertheless caused an outcry from European regulators and the financial industry, 
and the EU checked the US rules with a near-identical approach (Artamonov 
2015, p. 12; Knaack 2015, pp. 1226‒1227).
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A carrot of deference nevertheless complements the stick of extraterrito-
riality. In the EU, the so-called equivalence regime allows the possibility of 
disapplying EU rules in favour of another jurisdiction if its regulatory and 
supervisory regime is considered adequately ‘equivalent’ to that in the EU. 
The EU Commission, assisted by ESMA, may adopt implementing acts declar-
ing that the legal, supervisory and enforcement arrangements of a third country 
are equivalent to the requirements laid down in EMIR (Art. 13(2)). Upon 
such determination, market participants can comply with EU requirements 
by being compliant with the requirements of their own, non-EU, jurisdiction 
(EMIR, Art. 13(3)). An equivalence decision also makes it possible for ESMA 
to formally recognise a third-country CCP or a third-country trade repository 
(EMIR Arts. 25(2)(a), 25(6) and 75(1)). Such entity-specific recognition levels 
the playing field between EU-based entities and foreign entities, allowing 
the latter to offer their services in the EU single market on equivalent terms. 
If circumstances change, the ESMA can withdraw its recognition or the 
Commission can review its equivalence decision. The European Commission 
has so far adopted 23 equivalence decisions with respect to the regulatory 
regimes for derivatives and central counterparties of 14 countries (7 June 
2019). On the basis of these equivalence decisions, ESMA has recognised 
more than 30 third-country CCPs from non-EU jurisdictions, thus allowing 
these CCPs to provide clearing services in the EU.
Much like in the EU, the extraterritorial effect of US regulation can be lifted 
in the framework of substituted compliance. In its original form, substituted 
compliance was designed to open up the possibility for foreign actors wishing 
to conduct business in the US to avoid burdensome and duplicative SEC reg-
istration requirements and certain other US rules (Tafara and Peterson 2007). 
The more recent substituted compliance framework is designed with a view 
to adjusting the extraterritorial application of the Dodd–Frank Act. Under this 
regime, certain offshore persons and entities that might come under the scope 
of US rules can instead comply with regulations in their home jurisdictions 
(Jackson 2015). The Commodity and Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) 
has issued 10 comparability determinations which cover the EU, Australia, 
Canada, Japan, Hong Kong and Switzerland, making favourable determina-
tions in favour of all six. The scope of the comparability determinations has 
nevertheless been limited, excluding many ‘transaction-level’ requirements.3
Such deference strategies represent an important exception to the traditional 
modus operandi of international financial regulation, where “each state prefers 
to address cross-border challenges simply by applying its own laws” (Verdier 
2013, pp. 1438‒1439). However, as the next section will show, getting to the 
actual decision can be a time-consuming and delicate process.
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5.2.4 The Transatlantic Turf Battle Regarding CCPs
Ideally, the stick of extraterritoriality and the carrot of deference should 
have led to negotiated convergence between the EU and the US, ultimately 
giving rise to a regime of mutual recognition. Without material differences 
in rules, there would be fewer risks of regulatory arbitrage and fewer effects 
on markets. The negotiations appeared to get off to a good start. In 2013, 
the parties released the so-called Path Forward statement. The agreement 
laid down a road map towards mutual recognition of derivative rules and 
outlined a package of measures for approaching common issues concerning 
cross-border derivatives. According to the statement, the parties would not 
seek to apply their rules “unreasonably” in the other jurisdiction but instead 
would “rely on the application and enforcement of the rules by the other 
jurisdiction” (CFTC 2013a). After the statement, the talks continued in dif-
ferent fora, both official and unofficial. Participants held several meetings in 
the context of the ‘Financial Markets Regulatory Dialogue’, which was later 
renamed the ‘Joint EU–US Financial Regulatory Forum’. The purpose of the 
Forum (which has convened once or twice a year) is, among other things, to 
“work towards avoiding regulatory arbitrage and towards compatibility […] of 
each other’s standards” (Joint Statement 2016).
Despite comforting declarations and good intentions, the bargain proved to 
be an exceptionally hard one to strike. By September 2015, the negotiations 
were locked in a stalemate (Stafford 2015). The range of negotiation issues was 
extensive, as was detailed in ESMA’s September 2013 final technical advice 
to the European Commission regarding the US regulatory framework (ESMA 
2013). One problem concerned the duplicative or conflicting requirements 
regarding the clearing obligation and risk-mitigation techniques for uncleared 
OTC derivative contracts. However, the recognition of third-country CCPs 
was a key concern. The mandatory offloading of derivatives to the perceived 
safety of centralised clearing creates much new business for CCPs but there 
is also a risk that the competitive environment pressures CCPs to lower their 
risk management requirements. These concerns were clearly spelled out in 
the Commission’s EMIR impact assessment, which noted the possibility that 
regulation could prompt CCPs to compete on risk, that is, compete “through 
lowering the quality of risk management, more specifically by cutting the 
margins required from the clearing members” (Commission 2010, p. 68). The 
deliberations also noted anecdotal evidence supporting this concern:
A number of market participants seem to fear that this is already happening. They 
have privately told the Commission services on various occasions that CCPs had 
started lowering their risk standards in order to lower their costs and attract more 
clients. Recently, a CCP voiced the same concern in public [footnote omitted]. 
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These claims were never backed with concrete evidence, so the Commission ser-
vices cannot judge whether they are true or not. Irrespective of whether they are true 
or not, however, they highlight a potentially dangerous side effect of competition 
between CCPs.
The EU Commission and the ESMA were therefore reluctant to declare 
the US regime for CCPs equivalent. Without such a decision, the ESMA 
could not recognise US-based CCPs and give them unhindered access to EU 
clearing markets. Failure to reach an agreement risked further reducing the 
cross-border-derivative activity between the EU and US. The reason is simple: 
without a deal, trading and clearing at home would become much cheaper 
than abroad. For instance, EU Capital Requirements Regulation 575/2013 
sets higher capital requirements for transactions that are cleared through a 
‘non-qualified’ (i.e. non-authorised or non-recognised) CCP (Art. 382(3)).
ESMA pushed especially adamantly for a harder approach. It criticised 
the EU’s liberal approach to CCP recognition, noting its extreme openness 
and excessive reliance on third-country rules and supervisory arrangements 
(ESMA 2015). In contrast, the US authorities required all third-country CCPs 
to become subject to the direct jurisdiction of the US authorities (ESMA 2013, 
pp. 20‒21). While the EU’s original approach arguably presented a “model in 
terms of mutual reliance”, it worsened Europe’s position in the transatlantic 
bargaining process (ESMA 2013, paras 108‒109).
Only on 15 March 2016 – four years after the ‘Path Forward Agreement’ 
– did the Commission adopt an equivalence decision concerning the US 
regulatory framework for central counterparties. The ESMA followed suit, 
recognising several US-based CCPs between June and December 2016. 
From there on, things ran apparently smoothly. On 13 October 2017, the 
European Commission adopted an EMIR equivalence decision for derivative 
transactions in the United States and thus settled the issue concerning the 
legal, supervisory and enforcement arrangements for non-centrally-cleared 
OTC derivative transactions. In particular, the decision covered the rules on 
risk monitoring and the mandatory exchange of collateral for such contracts. 
Finally, in December 2017 the Commission adopted an equivalence decision 
under MiFIR concerning US-based derivative trading venues, therefore ensur-
ing that European market participants could continue to trade derivatives on 
US platforms.
The bargain was far from complete, however. Soon after the EU reached 
a political agreement on updating the EMIR in March 2019, tensions over the 
regulation and supervision of overseas CCPs resurfaced. A struggle to control 
and oversee London-based CCPs in particular risked undermining the fragile 
transatlantic agreement. London-based CCPs have for long troubled the euro-
zone and especially the European Central Bank, which has sought more over-
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sight powers and even threatened to limit the access of London-based CCPs 
to the eurozone under its controversial Location Policy (Marjosola 2015). 
This issue has re-intensified because of Brexit (Chamorro-Courtland 2019). 
The EU is anxious to tighten its grip over London’s CCPs, which remain 
the principal destination for the clearing of euro-denominated derivatives. 
However, London-based CCPs also handle most of the dollar-denominated 
derivatives. The EU’s new proposal effectively provided that if London-based 
CCPs wished to continue to clear euro-denominated contracts after Brexit, 
they would either have to move their business within the EU bloc or accept 
ESMA’s oversight and regulation (Tett 2019).
As Bulfone and Smoleńska show in Chapter 3 in this book, the review of 
EMIR will bring many crucial changes to the ESMA’s powers. In the future, 
the ESMA will have significantly wider regulatory and supervisory powers, 
particularly as regards third-country CCPs. ESMA will categorise each 
third-country CCP as either a non-systemically important CCP (Tier 1 CCP) 
or a systemically important CCP (Tier 2 CCP). In the latter case, the relevant 
CCPs will become subject to additional requirements and the third-country’s 
regulatory and supervisory framework will have to pass much more intense 
regulatory scrutiny to maintain the equivalence status.
The review of the CCP supervisory and oversight framework re-intensified 
the transatlantic conflict. The US policymakers and regulators feared that 
the second generation of EU extraterritoriality, as introduced in the EMIR 
reform, was targeted not only at London but also at US-based clearing houses. 
A political agreement in the form of a joint statement between the European 
Commission and the CFTC – the US swap regulator – managed to ease the 
tension, but only temporarily (Brunsden and Stafford 2019; Stafford 2019). 
Despite the standoff, the CFTC managed to reign in its uncompromising 
requirements for overseas CCPs, allowing limited deference to third-country 
regulators such as Japan’s (Stafford and Rennison 2019).
The position of London in the transatlantic derivative conflict is also telling 
of the capacity of the post-Brexit UK to engage in regulatory competition 
vis-à-vis the US and the EU. Hosting systemically important financial market 
infrastructure, it will have no choice but to concede significant oversight and 
supervisory powers to both US and European regulators, at least if it wishes to 
continue servicing market participants from these jurisdictions.
The regulatory turf war between the US and the EU is disconcerting, given 
that transatlantic communication channels and collaboration venues have 
been in place for more than ten years. During 2004‒2007, the Committee 
of European Securities Regulators (which later became ESMA) met several 
times with the CFTC in the context of a joint work programme which explic-
itly aimed to facilitate the conduct and supervision of transatlantic derivative 
business. On the other hand, the dispute is less surprising if considered against 
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the shifting of bargaining power. The power asymmetry between the Atlantic 
neighbours has been in steady decline, not least because of the institutional 
evolution and the centralisation of regulatory authority within the EU (Karmel 
2007; Posner 2009). The next section examines what role, if any, the new 
global regulatory space for OTC derivatives has played in centralising regula-
tory structures.
5.3 THE GLOBAL REGULATORY SPACE AND 
SHIFTING STRUCTURES OF REGULATION
5.3.1 Centralisation of Regulatory Authority in the EU
The purpose of this section is to examine the book’s hypothesis that regulatory 
competition, together with the risk of regulatory arbitrage, prompts regulatory 
centralisation in internal regulatory structures.
First of all, from the vertical international perspective, the growing impor-
tance of global financial regulation constitutes a compelling reason to shift 
regulatory authority from the Member State level to the EU level. Indeed, the 
lack of centralised regulatory authority and the inability to speak with one 
voice have probably held back the development of the European financial 
markets (Pan 2003). However, as far as the drafting of global financial stand-
ards is concerned, the Union is still far from the single representative model, 
even when it comes to the representation of the eurozone (see De Ryck 2019). 
The EU is currently a full member of the G20 and so directly represented in 
the most important standard-setters such as the BSCBs. In addition, the ECB 
and the SSM (the Banking Union’s single supervisory arm hosted by the ECB) 
are full members of the BSCB4 whereas ESMA is a full member of IOSCO. 
However, other European G20 members, and some other Member States with 
developed financial markets, continue to be represented in these forums too.
What is more interesting for the purpose of this chapter is the case for 
centralisation when it comes to the implementation of international financial 
standards and G20 policies. The transatlantic turf battle illustrates the formi-
dable task financial regulators face in having to coordinate implementation 
with their foreign colleagues, whose mandates, reform calendars, priorities and 
perhaps even incentives are different from their own. As one commissioner 
from the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) described it:
[…] at no time in the [SEC’s] history have we been more engaged with the interna-
tional community or more involved in collaborative work streams with our fellow 
regulators from around the globe. Much of this international work stems from 
the 2009 G20 initiatives regarding over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives reforms. 
(Piwowar 2014)
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Such international coordination demands are increasing across the spectrum of 
financial regulations (IOSCO 2015). The need to coordinate the implementa-
tion of G20 derivative policy globally first means that implementing powers 
must be kept at the EU level. It is no surprise that European derivative legisla-
tion has been adopted in the form of directly applicable regulations (EMIR and 
MiFIR). Both acts also include various provisions delegating authority to the 
European Commission and the ESMA to develop more detailed rules in this 
area and to deal with the problem of duplicative and conflicting international 
rules (see, e.g. MiFIR, Article 33). Indeed, in no other area of financial regu-
lation has the ESMA been so active in developing binding technical standards 
(which the Commission has endorsed without changes) (Moloney 2018, 
p. 133). To the extent that Member State national authorities have influenced 
implementation, they have done it through ESMA’s governing bodies and 
working groups.
The need to coordinate implementation internationally therefore provides 
yet another justification for replacing directives – the EU legislative instru-
ment which by definition leaves implementation of its provisions to Member 
States – with directly applicable regulations which centralise implementation. 
On the other hand, as Strand shows in Chapter 4 of this book, there are no 
significant structural differences between the revised Markets in Financial 
Instruments Directive (MiFID II) and its sister regulation (MiFIR); MiFID II 
also centralises implementation by delegating extensive rule-making powers 
to the Commission and the ESMA, thus narrowing the scope for implementa-
tion left to the Member States.
The degree of regulatory centralisation also depends on the amount of power 
delegated to the ESMA and the Commission. The preceding section showed 
that regulators on both sides of the Atlantic needed to engage in extensive 
cross-border negotiations on the final content of their rulebooks in order to 
achieve the necessary convergence. However, the respective regulators’ room 
for manoeuvre was limited by their legislative mandates. Here, the imbalance 
of power was considerable. The US federal agencies, such as the SEC and 
CFTC, have historically enjoyed considerable flexibility and discretion to 
pursue their tasks, including by issuing binding legal acts. In sharp contrast, 
constitutional restrictions (the so-called Meroni doctrine) in the EU require 
that EU agencies such as the ESMA pursue their mandates without a wide 
margin of discretion and so with much less flexibility (see Bergström 2015; 
Marjosola 2015). For instance, whereas the SEC and the CFTC can relatively 
freely roll back or extend the scope of the Dodd–Frank Act’s derivative rules, 
the EU needed to resort to burdensome and lengthy legislative processes to 
scale back some of the more strenuous provisions of the EMIR. Regulation 
2019/834 (EMIR Refit), which entered into force on 17 June 2019, simpli-
fied certain areas covered by the EMIR Regulation and introduced “a more 
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proportionate approach” in line with the Commission’s Regulatory Fitness 
and Performance programme. In certain areas, such as where it comes to the 
definition of financial and non-financial counterparties for the purposes of 
determining the scope of the rules, the amendment brought the rules closer to 
those in force in the US. Some amendments were explicitly motivated by the 
need to “enable international regulatory convergence” (see, e.g. recital 21 of 
the EMIR Refit).
This latter finding about legislative delegations is also interesting from the 
perspective of another of this book’s hypotheses. According to one of the 
hypotheses presented in Chapter 1, vague legislative provisions contribute 
to decentralisation or fragmentation of regulatory structures. This chapter 
suggests that the applicability of this hypothesis should be restricted, at 
least insofar as it concerns areas in which legislative vagueness is filled 
with Union-level executive acts such as binding technical standards (and 
non-binding guidelines and other soft law acts issued by European supervisory 
authorities). For instance, EMIR has been amplified by more than 30 highly 
detailed regulatory technical standards5 which concern such crucial issues as 
the criteria to be used when determining which classes of derivatives should 
be subject to mandatory clearing. Instead of the EMIR determining which 
derivatives should be cleared through CCPs (a list that would be very hard to 
draw up ex ante), the EMIR delegates the responsibility to the ESMA and the 
Commission.6
The need to globally coordinate the implementation of financial regulation 
will pressure the EU legislators to delegate more authority to the European 
Commission and the ESAs. Indeed, the recent review of the powers and 
tasks of the European supervisory authorities explicitly referred to both 
the risk of regulatory arbitrage and the need to coordinate implementation 
with third-country supervisors as justification for centralising the certain 
supervisory powers within ESMA. As the recital states, ESMA’s role as the 
Union-wide competent authority “establishes it as the counterpart in the Union 
for supervisors in third countries, making cross-border cooperation more effi-
cient and effective” (ESA Review, recital 55).
5.3.2 Consolidation of Regulatory Authority – Lessons from the US
Increased inter-agency coordination demands in the global arena may also 
prompt consolidation of regulatory authority horizontally within jurisdictions. 
As mentioned previously, shared regulatory spaces created by overlapping and 
duplicative delegations are a common phenomenon in national and regional 
contexts, for example where multiple agencies are delegated similar functions, 
or where agencies regulate different products or activities but with a shared 
purpose (Freeman and Rossi 2011, pp. 1145‒1148). The US financial regula-
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tory structure provides a popular example of such a shared regulatory space. In 
the US, the competence in the field of derivatives is shared between the SEC 
and the CFTC; the CFTC is the primary regulator for OTC swaps while the 
SEC regulates security-based swaps, and the agencies regulate ‘mixed swaps’ 
jointly. Recognising the functional overlap, the Dodd–Frank Act requires the 
agencies to coordinate and consult not only with each other but also with other 
relevant regulators before commencing rulemaking in the area of derivatives 
(see GAO 2011, p. 23). Such a fragmented regulatory structure with several 
regulators and overlapping mandates is a historical feature of the entire US 
financial regulatory structure. For instance, five federal agencies share the 
responsibility for regulating depository institutions, which can also be regu-
lated by state regulators (Pan 2011, p. 837).
Such overlapping and multiple delegations can result in various weaknesses 
in terms of efficiency, effectiveness and accountability, alongside certain 
possible advantages (Freeman and Rossi 2011, pp. 1150‒1151). Freeman and 
Rossi argue that shared regulatory spaces are less problematic than is often 
thought, and that the case for consolidating ‘redundant’ agencies under one 
roof has been significantly oversold in the academic literature. Their argu-
ment is that such mergers might simply “convert an interagency coordination 
problem into an intra-agency problem” (Freeman and Rossi 2011, p. 1154) and 
that the debate so far has neglected the ability of different coordination tools to 
mitigate inter-agency coordination problems.
A significant blind spot in Freeman and Rossi’s analysis, particularly as 
it concerns the regulation of derivatives, is that it ignores the cross-border 
context. As this chapter has shown, the regulatory space for financial deriv-
atives post-G20 reforms transcends jurisdictional borders. In these contexts, 
the lack of clarity as to which of the US government branches, departments or 
agencies is responsible for implementing policy – and the fact that they often 
disagree on policy issues – is obviously much more problematic (see also Riles 
2014, p. 81). The SEC and the CFTC have traditionally followed very different 
regulatory philosophies (Markham 2003) and they have a history of engaging 
in dysfunctional turf battles (Pan 2008, p. 243). Anecdotal evidence suggests 
that such inter-agency rivalry between the SEC and CFTC has not been absent 
in the regulatory space for derivatives either (see Piwowar 2014).
More efficient use of coordination tools could no doubt help overcome 
such coordination problems, as Freeman and Rossi (2011) suggest, but the 
transatlantic derivative narrative has also shown that multiple and overlapping 
delegations make it challenging to speak with one voice in cross-border nego-
tiations (Brummer 2013, pp. 13–14). In its equivalence assessment, the ESMA 
also recognised the challenges arising from the fact that the implementation of 
derivative rules was not adequately synchronised between the CFTC and SEC. 
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Therefore, the growing need to also share regulatory space internationally 
might strengthen the case for agency consolidation.
In the EU, the implementation of derivative reforms lands relatively clearly 
within the substantive remit of the ESMA, and there has been much less need 
to coordinate the reforms with the other European agencies and bodies forming 
the European System of Financial Supervision. Another thing entirely is that 
the European agencies are executive rather than regulatory in nature. As the 
preceding section noted, ESMA and the other ESAs are relatively toothless 
when compared to independent regulatory agencies such as the SEC and the 
CFTC. Indeed, when it comes to making policy deals such as the 2013 Path 
Forward agreement, the ESMA has primarily played an advisory role. The 
European Commission still has the final authority to enter such deals. However, 
the new EMIR rules will take a significant step forward in both centralising 
and consolidating authority within the ESMA regarding third-country CCPs. 
Apart from monitoring equivalence, ESMA’s new Supervisory Committee 
will be vested with direct supervisory powers over third-country CCPs. The 
Supervisory Committee may even withdraw the recognition of a systemically 
important (Tier 2) CCP and thus force its mandatory relocation to the EU (see 
also Chapter 3 by Bulfone and Smoleńska in this book).
5.4 FROM UNILATERALISM TO BILATERALISM 
AND BEYOND
This penultimate section will briefly consider certain drawbacks of the 
above-examined unliteral regulatory strategies and assess their possible impli-
cations for financial regulatory structures. First, deference strategies require 
regulators to continually vet foreign regulatory structures and monitor foreign 
supervision and enforcement. This is a complex and costly exercise (Jackson 
2015). For instance, ESMA’s technical advice about the equivalence of the 
US regime for derivatives includes a line-by-line comparison table covering 
more than 200 pages followed by more than 1,000 footnotes. The ESMA has 
itself noted the “extremely rigid and burdensome” nature of the recognition 
process for third-country CCPs and the equivalence decision process (ESMA 
2015, para. 115). The rigidity of the substituted compliance process in the US 
has also been criticised. In an opinion on the final rules on the international 
application of standards, one CFTC commissioner noted that “the Commission 
has embarked on a cross-border analysis that I fear is taking us down a path 
of regulatory detail that is overly burdensome, complicated, and unnecessary” 
(CFTC 2013b, p. 881, dissenting statement by Commissioner Jill E. Sommers). 
As Chris Brummer (2013, p. 5) has noted, such “check-the-box metrics […] 
can become quickly outdated in a fast-paced financial marketplace”.
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The EU’s equivalence regime, which also covers several areas other than 
derivatives, has produced more than 200 equivalence decisions assessing 
a total of 32 jurisdictions (European Commission 2017a). There is little indi-
cation of how the EU will manage to oversee the developing rulebooks in all 
these jurisdictions or make sure that the rules that are in place are backed by 
adequate enforcement and supervision (see also Brummer 2013, p. 5).
A less-intrusive and outcomes-focused approach would demand fewer 
resources but it would also require mutual trust, which in the absence of cred-
ible commitment will be hard to kindle. As the transatlantic derivative dispute 
illustrates, without binding international standards or organisations enforcing 
them, regulators’ commitments are vulnerable to political reconsiderations 
and compromises (Brummer 2013, pp. 115‒116, 136). Indeed, the difficult 
cross-border politics of derivative regulation reflects the relatively weak status 
of transnational regulatory institutions in securities and financial regulation 
(Posner 2018).
On the other hand, such coordination and monitoring costs will probably 
not prevent achieving the main advantage of unilateral regulatory strategies. 
Deference strategies, combined with the sticks of extraterritoriality and pro-
tectionism, provide an effective way to export regulatory rules and practices 
to ‘weaker’ states (see Raustiala 2002, pp. 7‒9). Official EU documentation 
even explicitly acknowledges this purpose, noting that “a possible equivalence 
finding by the EU is one of the major incentives for third-country regulators to 
enhance supervisory co-operation and to seek closer regulatory convergence 
with the EU” (European Commission 2017a, p. 4, emphasis added). Indeed, 
despite the declining importance of the US and the EU as the primary loci of 
global capital markets (Cox 2012; Brummer 2013, p. 7; Lannoo 2013, p. 21), 
they together still account for roughly 90 per cent of the market for derivatives 
(Stafford 2015). Therefore, a deeper transatlantic partnership would force 
other jurisdictions to converge towards US–EU standards.
However, the coordination problems will not be solved simply by turning 
a unilateral regulatory strategy into a bilateral one. A joint EU–US leadership 
would only increase the coordination demands between the Atlantic partners, 
which would need to act in concert towards the rest of the world. Moreover, 
as we have already seen, the competitive pressure for market share would 
constantly risk disintegrating the informal alliance. What such considerations 
make clear, however, is that when it comes to fields of financial regulation 
such as derivatives, there are few centrifugal forces affecting the regulatory 
structures. On the contrary, many have proposed hardening the soft mode of 
global financial governance with more hierarchical and hard-law structures 
(see, e.g., Avgouleas 2012; Lastra 2014; Artamonov 2015).
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5.5 CONCLUSIONS
The findings in this chapter support the hypothesis that the highly contested 
global regulatory space for OTC derivatives has contributed to the centralisa-
tion of regulatory structures in the European Union. Regulatory competition 
and the risk of regulatory arbitrage have provided explicit justifications for 
centralising regulatory and supervisory powers in the Commission and the 
ESMA. The transatlantic coordination exercise has emphasised the need 
to be able to negotiate in cross-border dialogues with one voice and with 
a clear mandate. The need to share regulatory space globally therefore also 
strengthens the case for consolidating regulatory authority horizontally within 
jurisdictions.
A number of lessons can be drawn from the regulatory turf battle between 
the US and the EU. First, global reforms should already be coordinated 
better when drafting legislation. Second, the executive authorities in charge 
of coordinating implementation with their foreign colleagues should have 
broad enough, functional and compatible mandates. In the EU, however, 
constitutional restrictions limit the delegation of a wide degree of discretion 
to the executive bodies. This means that more significant fine-tuning – as 
evidenced by the recently updated EMIR – will have to go through Union 
legislative bodies also in the future. Closing the transatlantic deal on OTC 
derivatives would be crucial to stop or at least slow down the ongoing market 
fragmentation and to counter the immediate regulatory arbitrage threats. For 
the time being, the EU and the US seem able to use their dominant positions 
in the markets for derivatives to export their rules overseas. In the longer run, 
such a ‘regulate thy neighbour’ model of global financial governance is far 
from optimal, not least due to its large monitoring and coordination costs. Such 
problems have increased calls to also centralise regulatory powers globally.
NOTES
1. This chapter is partly based on Marjosola, H. 2016, Regulate thy neighbour: 
competition and conflict in the cross-border regulatory space for OTC derivatives. 
Working Paper, EUI LAW, 2016/01, European Regulatory Private Law Project 
(ERPL-16).
2. Margins comprise an ‘initial margin’, a fixed component paid up front and a ‘var-
iation margin’, which is paid periodically based on changes in the value of open 
positions (Feder 2002, pp. 733‒734).
3. For the complex process of developing the respective derivative rules by the 
CFTC and SEC, see especially Artamonov 2015; Coffee 2014; Greene and Potiha 
2012 and Greene and Potiha 2013.
4. The EBA and the Commission have observer status.
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5. See the list of binding technical standards on ESMA’s website: https:// www. esma 
.europa .eu/ convergence/ guidelines -and -technical -standards (last visited 10 
September 2019).
6. On the other hand, this ‘top-down’ approach is complemented by a ‘bottom-up’ 
approach according to which the scope of clearing is partly based on the classes of 
derivatives already cleared by authorised or recognised CCPs (see EMIR Article 
5(2)). This suggests a level of decentralisation, but one that also sidesteps national 
authorities by relying instead on market participants.
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